A multifaceted approach, incorporating military action, socioeconomic development, and diplomatic measures, is essential to dismantling the TTP's operational framework.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has emerged as a formidable threat, challenging the writ of the state. This phenomenon has thrived due to successive government policies that encouraged non-state actors to deepen their influence, particularly in areas where madrasas played a pivotal role in waging jihad against Soviet invaders. Controlling the TTP has now become a significant challenge for the government.
This militant entity grew in parallel with the Afghan jihad, creating avenues for religious elements to expand their influence and resources in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Ex-FATA). The mushrooming of madrasas, fueled by American and Saudi funding, allowed orthodox religious forces to carve out spaces to promote their ideology. Consequently, the erosion of the rule of law became so pronounced that the TTP now openly challenges state authority.

Despite its violent ideology, the TTP continues to exist without commanding mass support. The group lacks control over substantial territory inside Pakistan, with its fighters often on the run or holed up in remote villages.

Soviet Invasion and Religious Fervor
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan fueled religious fervor in the already conservative Ex-FATA region, which shares a border with Afghanistan. It suited Pakistan's government to align with Afghan jihadist groups, though this strategy did not unfold as planned.
The War on Terror (WOT) created new paradigms with international repercussions. External factors, particularly U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan and Ex-FATA, deepened the wedge between local populations and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). The TTP capitalized on these grievances. A U.S. drone strike on a madrasa in Bajaur Agency, linked to Tehrik-e-Nifaz Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), in October 2006 led to the formal emergence of the TTP in 2007, uniting several militant factions under Baitullah Mehsud (killed in a 2009 American drone strike). The Pakistan Army's Operation Rah-e-Haq further catalyzed the group's consolidation.
The TTP Phenomenon
Despite its violent ideology, the TTP continues to exist without commanding mass support. The group lacks control over substantial territory inside Pakistan, with its fighters often on the run or holed up in remote villages. However, it finds safe havens inside Afghanistan, where its ideological allies hold power. Several interlocking factors contribute to the group's persistence:
Fragmented Structure. The TTP is not a monolith; it comprises over two dozen smaller groups bound by tribal affiliations rather than a unified ideology. These factions prioritize local influence over religious dogma.
Limited Religious Credibility. TTP leaders lack recognition as authentic Islamic scholars. Their followers, mostly semi-literate or illiterate tribesmen, have a rudimentary understanding of Islam, reducing the group's ideological legitimacy. However, the gun power makes TTP cadres a bully on the block. 
Madrasa Networks. Some madrasas operating under TTP patronage enjoy local support or deference due to fear of reprisals. Since the writ of the state has weakened, a significant number of these madrasas have become nurseries for brainwashing young minds toward extremism.
Propaganda and Recruitment. The TTP increasingly portrays itself as the "savior" of the people, targeting security forces to legitimize its cause. It recruits fighters through coercion, demanding either financial contributions or a workforce for jihad, a tactic reminiscent of Afghan Taliban strategies during the U.S. occupation.
Fear Factor. Locals are compelled to provide food and shelter to TTP fighters, reinforcing the group's stronghold through intimidation rather than popular endorsement. 
Afghan Taliban's Mentoring of TTP
Ironically, the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) is not only hand-in-glove with the TTP but facilitates the terrorist organization under the garb of Pashtunwali (Pashtun code of hospitality). TTP leadership is lodged in Kabul, greater Paktika, and Khost, while its second-rank leadership is accommodated in various ministries in Kabul and provinces. A Voice of America (VOA) report in July 2024 claimed that the Taliban's spy agency, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), facilitated three new guest houses in Kabul for TTP leaders and reportedly issued passes to senior TTP figures to enable ease of movement and immunity from arrest, as well as weapons permits.
Strangely, the Afghan Taliban deny the presence of the TTP despite international consensus to the contrary. A July 2024 United Nations (UN) report noted that the TTP is "operating in Afghanistan with an estimated strength of 6,000-6,500 fighters". It added: "Further, the Taliban have proved unable or unwilling to manage the threat from Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, whose attacks into Pakistan have intensified… Taliban support for the TTP also appears to have increased."

TTP leaders lack recognition as authentic Islamic scholars. Their followers, mostly semi-literate or illiterate tribesmen, have a rudimentary understanding of Islam, reducing the group's ideological legitimacy.

A VOA report, quoting the UN assessment, raised the alarm that TTP operatives, along with local fighters, are being trained in al-Qaida (AQ) camps that the terrorist outfit has set up in multiple border provinces such as Nangarhar, Kandahar, Kunar, and Nuristan. AQ’s support for TTP also involves sharing Afghan fighters for military staffing or attack formations. The UN report, alluding to a member state, opined that "greater collaboration" with al-Qaida could transform TTP into an "extra-regional threat."
Not only is the TTP thriving under the Afghan Taliban's mentorship, but over a dozen terrorist organizations are taking shelter in Afghanistan; the UN assessment missions and other reputed non-governmental organizations, including Amnesty International, document their activities. Despite denying the presence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the terrorist activities perpetrated by these outfits have been well documented. It is no secret how ISKP has been operating within Afghanistan against the religious minorities, especially Shias. Its lethal attacks in Pakistan, Iran, and Russia made international headlines. However, the Taliban regime in Kabul has adopted a strange attitude in tackling the challenges posed by these terrorist organizations; it refuses the presence of ISKP in Afghanistan. Such a state of denial by the Afghan Taliban can spell disaster for the region and beyond if serious measures are not taken to stem various terrorist outfits taking shelter in the war-ravaged country. A Carnegie report, quoting a U.S. intelligence assessment, states that the ISKP could be capable of mounting an attack in the West, including in the United States, in the near future. Any alliance between the TTP and the ISKP could strengthen the ISKP and worsen its threat beyond the region.

TTP's Demands
The TTP follows a belligerent approach to establish its sway over the areas it contests. When, at the behest of the Afghan Taliban, a dialogue the Government of Pakistan started with the TTP in late 2021, the latter maintained a non-compromising stance, insisting on keeping their weapons, demanded demerging of the erstwhile FATA, indemnity against the heinous crimes such as Army Public Sschool (APS) massacre and, more importantly, refusing to owe allegiance to the country's constitution. Naturally, no government could have agreed to such an unrealistic attitude from the TTP. A deeper analysis of the TTP's uncanny attitude would reveal that the outfit has adopted a multipronged strategy to promote its violent agenda on the pretext of establishing Sharia in Pakistan, especially in the former FATA region. 

The Afghan Interim Government (AIG) is not only hand-in-glove with the TTP but facilitates the terrorist organization under the garb of Pashtunwali (Pashtun code of hospitality). 

First, by refusing to surrender arms, the organization feared losing nuisance in areas under its influence and feeling vulnerable to rival tribes or maliks. Moreover, for the TTP's cadres, surrendering arms would be tantamount to accepting defeat, which the leadership was averse to. By and large, various factions in the TTP were strongly opposed to the idea of surrender.
Second, refusing to owe allegiance to Pakistan's constitution on the pretext that it is un-Islamic is based on a lame excuse as, at no stage the TTP negotiators could point out un-Islamic clauses in the constitution. It also became clear that Islam was used as a ruse to continue violence just to avoid mainstream politics, as has been the case with other religious parties functioning within the framework of the country's constitution. 
Third, TTP's refusal to face the law for heinous crimes, such as the massacre of over 150 APS children and teachers, was to undermine the state of Pakistan. No authority in Pakistan has the right to condone the savagery perpetrated by the TTP murderers against innocent children. It would have further reinforced the overwhelming view in the country about the erosion of the rule of law, especially during the past four decades of Afghan Jihad. 
Fourth, the TTP had its axe to grind regarding Ex-FATA's merger. TTP is staking claims on Ex-FATA as if it were its lost territory, which the Pakistan government has to return without realizing that FATA's merger took place after a two-thirds majority of the Parliament approved the constitutional amendment to this effect in May 2018. The redeeming feature of the merger was the abolition of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a popular demand in the area, particularly amongst the youth. This was unacceptable for the TTP as it would deprive its leadership of exclusive treatment, which was the hallmark before the merger. 

Strangely, the Afghan Taliban deny the presence of the TTP despite international consensus to the contrary. A July 2024 United Nations (UN) report noted that the TTP is "operating in Afghanistan with an estimated strength of 6,000-6,500 fighters". 

Fifth, the opposition to the merger also came from across the border, as the Afghan government, under President Ashraf Ghani, rejected the merger and threatened to raise the issue with the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Pakistan rejected the Afghan claim, termed it interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, and said the Parliament's decision on the merger reflected the people's will. Protests were also staged in the Afghan capital, Kabul, against the merger. It would not be surprising if the Taliban regime in Kabul would be nudging the TTP to insist on demerging the Ex-FATA.
Is There a Way Out?
Historically, political issues among antagonists have been resolved through negotiations. In the present case, whereby the TTP, as a non-state actor, has emerged as a violent force against the state. Tackling this situation would require political astuteness with clear redlines. 
First, non-state actors cannot be allowed to dictate their agenda by force. The grievances of such groups can be addressed only within the constitutional framework. The TTP does not recognize the country's constitution, which enjoys unanimity at the national level, including among religious parties. In such a situation, the writ of the state has to be established at all costs, irrespective of human and material losses.   
Second, a law enforcement mechanism with a clear mandate to establish the writ of the state has to be established. Let the police deal with counterterrorism (CT) with full political ownership by the elected representatives of the people. Paramilitary and armed forces may be available to aid the police authorities. Deficiencies in the execution of CT strategy should be addressed on a priority basis. 
Third, Ex-FATA bore the brunt of death and destruction ever since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After 9/11, the ferocity of bloodletting increased manifold. The government must pay special attention to the region to rehabilitate displaced people and honor its commitment to allocating development funds (PKR one trillion committed in 2018 for ten years by only PKR 72 billion spent till last year).
Fourth, the TTP cadres taking shelter in Afghanistan, mainly in the Khost and greater Paktika regions, are within Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani's domain. Mr. Haqqani, claiming to be a friend of Pakistan, will have to come clean and rein in the TTP cadres. As a first step, he has to disarm the TTP cadres and restrict the activities of the TTP leadership, enjoying his hospitality.
Fifth, given the TTP's links to AQ and ISKP, Pakistan must work with international partners, including the UN and regional allies, to curb the group's expansion and secure its borders. Pakistan should make full use of its membership in the UN Security Council to suggest concrete measures for neutralizing terrorist organizations and their harbors.
Finally, the TTP's resurgence underscores the urgent need for a coherent counterterrorism strategy. Pakistan cannot allow non-state actors to dictate their agenda through violence. The state must act decisively to restore stability in Ex-FATA and beyond. A multifaceted approach, incorporating military action, socioeconomic development, and diplomatic measures, is essential to dismantling the TTP's operational framework. If left unchecked, the TTP and its affiliated networks could pose a greater regional and global threat, making immediate and sustained intervention imperative.

The writer is Pakistan’s former Special Representative for Afghanistan. He has been ambassador to Iran and UAE. Currently, he is serving as a Senior Research Fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). He is the author of the book “Turmoil: Events in Afghanistan, South Asia, Middle East, Ukraine and Pakistan”.