As major powers vie for influence in the Indian Ocean, the escalating arms race in maritime assets, particularly nuclear-powered submarines, is reshaping regional dynamics.
The rivalry between the Great Powers in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is impacting the dynamics of the region and most prominently, an arms race is being witnessed amongst the major countries. This is especially evident in the maritime domain, where preparations are underway to ensure naval presence in key locations and efforts are being made to counter the adversary’s actions. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, in contrast to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has the potential to contribute to increased competition, tensions, and regional divisions. It is based on forming small groups of like-minded nations to counter China’s growing influence, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. This has generated a sense of insecurity among countries in the region.
Submarines have been a critical asset for any maritime nation since their inception. Their inherent stealth capability makes them an economical platform for any navy. This is why there has been rapid development in submarine technology, with advancements by one country leading to further developments by rivals, resulting in increasingly lethal versions. For a nuclear-armed country, submarines are of immense value as they provide assured second-strike capability, particularly when they are both nuclear-propelled and nuclear-armed. This phenomenon is worth understanding. For example, if a country uses its nuclear capability against an adversary, the assured second-strike capability ensures that the country retains residual strength for a counterstrike. This, in turn, mutually deters adversaries from initiating a first strike, knowing that a submarine-based nuclear missile counterstrike can be expected. However, a nuclear submarine is most vulnerable when at home.
It is with this significance that, under the Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. and the United Kingdom (UK) are providing nuclear-powered submarines to Australia under the AUKUS deal. This deal violates the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), specifically clauses one and two, which prohibit the provision of nuclear technology by a nuclear-weapon state and the receipt of such technology by a non-nuclear weapon state, respectively. Since the U.S. and the UK are nuclear-weapon states and Australia is a non-nuclear weapon state, this arrangement is an aberration of the NPT's provisions. This move is likely to instigate, if not catalyze, the ongoing arms race in the region. The repercussions are clear, as China is increasing its maritime assets, particularly nuclear-armed submarines, with India following suit.
China has at least six operational nuclear submarines that can carry upto 12 ballistic missiles each. The country has been rapidly developing its navy, and the number of submarines is expected to increase in the future. As India has been designated as the "Net Security Provider" for the Indian Ocean, it is also focusing on developing its maritime assets. To this end, India has embarked on constructing nuclear submarines capable of carrying nuclear missiles. After its first nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarine, Indian Navy Ship (INS) Arihant, India inducted its second nuclear submarine, INS Arighaat, on August 29, 2024. While the first was deployed on the western seaboard, the new Arighaat is primarily meant for the eastern seaboard, the Bay of Bengal. INS Arighaat can carry missiles in two configurations: 12 missiles with a range of 405 nautical miles or 4 missiles with a range of 1890 nautical miles, covering China’s Hainan Island naval bases. Additionally, India has an ambitious plan to build at least six such submarines, which are needed to maintain a round-the-clock presence in areas of interest. It is important to understand that maintaining a round-the-clock presence requires three platforms of similar capabilities: one deployed, one prepared for deployment, and one undergoing maintenance. This implies that if India is building six submarines, it intends to maintain a continuous presence with at least one such platform on both the western and eastern seaboards.
The Indian Navy has faced repeated incidents, including fires on submarines and ships. The recurring nature of these problems, including the Arihant mishap, raises questions about adherence to safety protocols and the sustainability of India’s submarine force. Over the past decade, there have been at least 15 incidents involving major naval accidents, highlighting systemic issues within the Indian Navy.
Moreover, India is building a nuclear submarine base on its east coast along the Bay of Bengal, named INS Varsha. This base has the facility of underground parking of submarines to protect them from the adversary’s surveillance and attack. This new base is close to many IAF airbases, which assure aerial protection. The Indian Navy also enjoys a kind of local superiority in the area due to benign, allied, and neutral countries in the vicinity of the base. India might have been instigated by the fact that China has built seaports in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. These ports are now frequently visited by Chinese Navy ships. China has also helped Bangladesh in constructing its first submarine base for the two submarines Bangladesh Navy operates. India must be perceiving the presence of Chinese submarines in its neighborhood, which has prompted it to construct its own base. Another important factor is the competition with China in the Bay of Bengal, which is crucial for Chinese trade. About 30 percent of the world’s trade and 80 percent of China’s trade passes through the Strait of Malacca via the Bay of Bengal. To protect this significant trade route, the Chinese Navy is vigilant in this area, and so too will the Indian Navy be, as mandated by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
The Indian Navy has had a chequered history in operating modern defense equipment. The fact that Indian submarines have been detected four times by the Pakistan Navy over the last seven years is indicative of the unsatisfactory training standards to which Indian crews are subjected. In the year 2019, post Pulwama days, INS Arihant was detected by Pakistan Navy’s aircraft who could prosecute it but just chased it out of Pakistani waters. It may be remembered that submarines do not have defense against aerial platforms and once detected it can be a sure kill.
While India is embarked on an arms race, its ability to materialise the projects on time and then ensuring capable manpower to handle them safely is a big challenge that Indian Navy is confronted with.
In 2017, INS Arihant was flooded with saltwater, damaging much of its equipment and requiring year-long repairs to make it operational again. This incident is significant, as only one nuclear submarine was out of service for about a year, severely affecting the overall capability. But this is not the only issue. The Indian Navy has faced repeated incidents, including fires on submarines and ships. The recurring nature of these problems, including the Arihant mishap, raises questions about adherence to safety protocols and the sustainability of India’s submarine force. Over the past decade, there have been at least 15 incidents involving major naval accidents, highlighting systemic issues within the Indian Navy. Concerns are growing that INS Arighaat may face similar challenges, given that it is operated by the same quality of crews.
Non-professional handling of the equipment and platforms aside, there have been inordinate delays in construction of defence projects, indicative of weak technical skills and lack of expertise in developing advanced military platforms. INS Arighaat’s construction was also delayed by three years, pointing to a lack of expertise in managing high-tech platforms. Frequent delays and technical setbacks in the projects expose India’s limited ability to manage critical strategic assets. While India is embarked on an arms race, its ability to materialise the projects on time and then ensuring capable manpower to handle them safely is a big challenge that Indian Navy is confronted with. Although, subsurface competition in Indian Ocean is already on its way, there are inherent dangers in the hands of those who are unable to strike a balance between the urge to modernise and the capability to absorb it.
The writer is a Communication Strategist at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.
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