India's nuclear black market, marked by alarming security failures and a surge in radioactive material thefts, casts a shadow over South Asia's stability. As the specter of nuclear terrorism looms larger, the world's silence on these dangerous developments raises urgent questions about global accountability and the protection of nuclear assets.
The operators of the Indian nuclear black market are uncontrollable due to the loopholes in the country's nuclear safety and security arrangement. Besides, the international community remained tight-lipped over the activities of the Indian nuclear mafia and missing nuclear material from India's nuclear facilities. The increasing incidents of nuclear thefts in India and the nuclear material's cross-border trafficking increase the likelihood of nuclear and radiological terrorism in South Asia.
Nuclear safety and security are significant concerns to the international community because of the probability of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 (2004) obliges every state to legislate laws to prevent the falling of nuclear and radiological material into the hands of non-state actors. The Obama administration convened four Nuclear Security Summits, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has introduced a series of initiatives to assist nations that have formally been involved in proliferation to counter the misuse of nuclear technology and material to prevent nuclear terrorism. Despite these initiatives, the nuclear black market is thriving in India. The role of the international community in addressing this issue is crucial, and it is concerning that international stakeholders have adopted an apathetic approach to the increasing vulnerability of the Indian nuclear industry.
The reported nuclear radioactive material incidents alarm about the existence of the nuclear black market in India. The nuclear black market consists of sellers (thieves), middlemen (traffickers), and potential buyers. A few reported incidents are spelled out in the following paragraphs to manifest the dangerous dynamics of flourishing illegitimate nuclear bazaars in India. These incidents testify that numerous thefts and smuggling of uranium and radioactive material from the Indian nuclear facilities have happened. On July 23, 1998, India's Central Bureau of Intelligence seized six kilograms of uranium from G. R. Arun, a city engineer, and S. Murthy, his associate in Tamil Nadu. The Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) scientists at Kalpakkam stated that the seized uranium was capable of radiation emission, having energy corresponding to natural Uranium-238 and U-235. Two uranium smuggling incidents were reported in Chennai (Madras), on the southeastern coast in 1998. In 2000, it was reported that a few Indian hospitals served as sources for nuclear and radioactive material smuggled through the cities of Mumbai (Bombay), Hyderabad, and Nettoor.
The increasing incidents of nuclear thefts in India and the nuclear material's cross-border trafficking increase the likelihood of nuclear and radiological terrorism in South Asia.
The radiography device containing the radioactive material, Iridium-192, went missing in India's northeastern Assam state while being transported from Lakhimpur to Digboi for use in a petrochemical plant in July 2000. The police in West Bengal (India) disclosed that they had arrested two men with more than 200 grams of semi-processed uranium on August 27, 2001. In August 2003, radioactive cobalt-60 sources were stolen from a steel factory in Jamshedpur, Bihar state, in eastern India; Indian authorities did not rule out the possibility that militant "Naxalite" groups might acquire this radioactive material. Moreover, the Indian security forces arrested members of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen possessing 225 grams of milled uranium in 2003. Notably, if militant or separatist groups have access to radioactive material, the probability of the use of dirty bombs cannot be ruled out. With stolen nuclear material, a militant group could manufacture a dirty bomb, also known as a radiation dispersal device (RDD). In RDD, conventional explosives are used to disperse radioactive materials to augment the injury and property damage caused by the explosion.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 (2004) obliges every state to legislate laws to prevent the falling of nuclear and radiological material into the hands of non-state actors.
Two uranium smuggling incidents were reported in Chennai (Madras), on the southeastern coast in 1998. In 2000, it was reported that a few Indian hospitals served as sources for nuclear and radioactive material smuggled through the cities of Mumbai (Bombay), Hyderabad, and Nettoor.
Realizing the dangers of illegal nuclear and radiological material trade on April 28, 2004, in its 4956th meeting, the UNSC adopted a non-proliferation resolution by which it decided that all states should refrain from supporting by any means non-state actors that attempt to require, use, or transfer nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. The UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 (2004) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Council also decided that all states would establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and means of delivery, particularly for terrorists, by establishing appropriate rules over the related material and adopting legislative measures. Since the passage of the Resolution, the international community has called on states to refrain from supporting non-state actors in their pursuit of radioactive material and to adopt and enforce domestic laws and controls towards this end. India supported the UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and implemented some policy measures congruent with the Resolution. Indian Parliament enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act in June 2005 to ensure the safety and security of nuclear material in compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). The Act criminalizes proliferation and provides national legislation prohibiting access to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons by non-state actors. It also aimed to prevent a rogue nuclear scientist or employee of the nuclear facility from transferring the world's deadliest radioactive nuclear material to the world's most dangerous people: terrorists who will not think twice about killing themselves and hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.
The alarming fact is that despite the institutional and statutory arrangements, the safety and security arrangements of India’s nuclear industry have loopholes. Therefore, the theft and illicit sale of nuclear and other radioactive materials have continued in India. For instance, in December 2016, around 9 kg of radioactive depleted uranium was confiscated from two persons in Thane, Maharashtra. In 2018, the Kolkata police seized one kilogram of radioactive material worth USD 440,000. In March 2021, four Nepalese were arrested in Kathmandu for possessing 2.5 kg of unprocessed uranium. An investigation revealed that the material had been smuggled from India to Nepal. In February 2022, eight people, including two Indian nationals (Upendra Kumar Mishra and Raju Thakur, both natives of Bihar), were arrested in Nepal for illegally possessing and attempting to sell a "uranium-like substance." The Nepali police investigation revealed that material was smuggled from India to be sold illegally in Nepal.
The Indian anti-terrorism squad arrested two persons—Jigar Pandya, 27, and Abu Tahir Afzal Husain Choudhary, 31—in Nagpur, India, and confiscated 7.1 kg (15.4 pounds) of natural uranium worth around USD 2.9 million on May 5, 2021. The lethality of the seized material by Indian law enforcement is debatable. Scientifically speaking, natural uranium is not radioactive, but depleted uranium is toxic. The alarming fact about the said nuclear material is that the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), located in Mumbai, pointed out that the apprehended natural uranium was highly radioactive and dangerous to human life. In July 2024, a gang was caught with a ‘radioactive device’ and ‘radioactive material’ in Dehradun. Recently, at the Balthari checkpost in Kuchaikote, Gopalgan, Patna, police seized 50 grams of radioactive californium worth INR 850 crore (over USD 100 million) and arrested three persons in the matter. On August 8, 2024. Gopalganj S. P. Swarn Prabhat said, "The smugglers had been trying to sell this material for several months.” The disturbing catch in the police officer’s admission is that radioactive material was in the possession of smugglers for months. However, the facility operators did not report the missing radioactive californium material. This means that the operators and the safety and security management team were unaware of the missing radioactive californium material or were party to the smugglers. In either case, the illegal possession of 50 grams of radioactive californium, once again, has exposed and alarmed the lapses in the safety and security apparatus of the expanding Indian nuclear industry.
Realizing the dangers of illegal nuclear and radiological material trade on April 28, 2004, in its 4956th meeting, the UNSC adopted a non-proliferation resolution by which it decided that all states should refrain from supporting by any means non-state actors that attempt to require, use, or transfer nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems.
Notably, the arrest of traffickers in Nepal has manifested that the Indian nuclear smugglers established a regional network. The stolen radioactive material from the Indian nuclear industry could be used in illegal activities in other states. Hence, the cross-border smuggling of radioactive material poses a serious challenge to the national security of the neighboring states of India. On August 13, 2024, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson, Mumtaz Zahra Baloch said, “Pakistan is gravely concerned at the reports of recurring incidents of theft and illicit sale of nuclear and other radioactive materials in India.” She stressed, “The international community seeks an earnest disclosure from the Indian authorities as to how a sealed radioactive source (SRS) material, like californium, was in the possession of the apprehended individuals.” The detection of nuclear material’s illegal proprietorship marked the existence of an international nuclear racket in India. However, the international community seems the least concerned about the routinely found sensitive radioactive material in the wrong hands in India.
The United States regularly applies sanctions to Chinese, Pakistani, North Korean, and Iranian companies and entities for alleged trading in nuclear-related goods, but it does not take similar actions against Indian companies due to the Indo-U.S. evolving threshold alliance. The international community, including Canada and Kazakhstan (the uranium suppliers to India), are tight-lipped over the frequent uranium material missing incidents in India. This uncommunicative approach to the loopholes in the Indian nuclear safety and security apparatus is detrimental to national, regional, and international security. Realistically, the selective approach undermines the global consensus to counter nuclear and radiological terrorism. The accessibility of radioactive material to non-state actors through the theft of the material from the nuclear facility is a violation of the UNSC Resolution 1540 and the IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Hence, the UNSC and IAEA need to pressure New Delhi to revamp and promulgate the national laws, which were constituted under the direction of UNSC Resolution 1540, to prevent the recurring theft and illicit sale of radioactive materials from its nuclear industry.
To conclude, the repeated thefts and arrests of nuclear smugglers in India highlight the frightening reality of India’s ‘Radioactive Bazaar’ and the growing black market for radioactive materials. Therefore, the international community should pursue India to institutionalize a comprehensive surveillance system over its nuclear infrastructure, improve its human and personnel reliability program, and introduce a defense-in-depth, including a layered security system to strengthen the physical protection of the nuclear facilities and mines. Thus, it is imperative that New Delhi raises the nuclear safety and security standards in the country to prevent the severe threats of nuclear terrorism in South Asia.
The writer is a Meritorious Professor of International Relations and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is also the author of Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia: Politics, Postures, and Practices (2024) and India’s Surgical Strike Stratagem: Brinksmanship and Response (2019, 2024) and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures and Restraint Regime in South Asia (2004).
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