Afghanistan faces severe economic challenges, with 97 percent of the population in poverty and over half in need of humanitarian aid. The Taliban's restrictive policies and denial of terrorism concerns have isolated them globally, prompting regional powers to consider engagement through the Moscow Format to address these issues.

There is a semblance of peace in Afghanistan after the Taliban's capture of power in Kabul in August 2021, but its fragility remains a source of concern for Pakistan and countries of the region. Most importantly, the economic conditions in Afghanistan are such that the country may face a famine-like situation in the near future unless international humanitarian assistance is increased. The present level of international humanitarian assistance is far behind addressing the urgent needs of 52 percent of the population, while the country's overall poverty graph stands at 97 percent. 
The political aspect of the incumbent dispensation in Afghanistan is rooted in Islamic ideology dominated by ultra-conservative tribalism. The Taliban rule is under close scrutiny in comparison to the previous Afghan administrations working under American patronage. International observers are acknowledging that the Taliban are less corrupt; they have increased customs revenues and have been paying the salaries of approximately one million government employees, which was not the case earlier as eighty percent of the government budget was borne by the U.S. and allies. Successful counternarcotics measures are another praiseworthy feat of the Taliban. By eradicating almost ninety percent of poppy cultivation in the country, the Taliban government has earned international accolades. 
While the above measures are appreciable, the Taliban's governance structure and style remain anathema to the outside world. The Taliban Supremo, Mullah Haibtullah's edict of banning girls' education and women's right to work has created a sense of harassment and helplessness in the country, especially over fifty percent women population. Internationally, such measures have been condemned across the board as repressive and denial of fundamental rights of women—a clear violation of the international human rights conventions to which Afghanistan has been a signatory. 

By eradicating almost ninety percent of poppy cultivation in the country, the Taliban government has earned international accolades. 

One clause of the edict commands the women not only to hide their faces and bodies but also to keep their voices low so they may not reach outside the boundaries of their homes. Ironically, these edicts are projected by the Taliban authorities as in consonance with the Afghan traditions and Islamic tenets. Given the conservative nature of the Afghan society, one may concede to the Afghan traditions to keep women from public life. Still, such a measure is certainly not ordained under the Islamic tenets. Therefore, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has outrightly rejected the edict as a misrepresentation of Islamic principles and a portrayal of a distorted image of Islam in the world.
The cumulative impact of the denial of educational and work rights to Afghan women has created an aversion against the Taliban rule at the international level, forbidding governments, especially in the West, from doing normal business with the Taliban government. The civil society in the West, where Afghans live in numbers, has already bound their governments not to recognize the Taliban regime and keep the relationship at the lowest level. 
Despite international reservations about the conduct of the Taliban regime, the world has to deal with the theocratic regime to mitigate the poverty issues affecting 97 percent population. Any punitive measures against the regime would only aggravate the plight of the overwhelming population, mostly adversely affecting the women and children, but also force the people to leave their country. Therefore, the Taliban regime's isolation does not augur well for Afghanistan and the world for a variety of reasons. 

The Taliban Supremo, Mullah Haibtullah's edict of banning girls' education and women's right to work has created a sense of harassment and helplessness in the country, especially over fifty percent women population.

First, terrorist organizations have been present in the country even before the withdrawal of the U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops; after the withdrawal, those terrorist organizations, in particular Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (now recognized as Fitna-al-Khawarij, FaK), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and a dozen others, have deepened their foothold in the country. Strangely, the Taliban regime is in denial mode about the presence of these terrorist organizations, but the United Nations (UN) and independent organizations have frequently challenged the Taliban's claims. FaK and ISKP's frequent attacks in Pakistan, in which Afghan nationals were involved, have been well documented. ISKP's attacks in Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan further highlight the veritable danger of terrorists using Afghan soil for their targets outside Afghanistan. Even Afghan cities are not immune from ISKP's savagery, where minorities are the special target of this terrorist outfit. If the Taliban regime remains isolated, as was the case during Taliban 1.0, the danger is that the terrorist organizations may enhance their activities and reenact a 9/11-type surprise. Therefore, leaving Afghanistan to its own devices would be a dangerous option for the world.
Second, on the economic front, the Taliban regime faces myriad problems due to a lack of governance experience, a flight of technocrats after the U.S. withdrawal and harsh social restrictions have created a vacuum, which would continue to haunt the country's economy in the foreseeable future. During the past forty-five years, whether under communist or American supervision, the Afghan economy has been dependent on foreign aid. The Taliban rule, whether 1996-2001 or now, has been synonymous with poverty. To mitigate the grim economic conditions in Afghanistan, urgent measures at the international level would be required. 
It is important to note that soon after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. imposed a freeze on USD 9 billion of the Afghan accounts, which have not been released to date. Concurrently, Afghan private banks do not have access to international correspondence to enhance Afghanistan's trade at the global level. Although not under sanctions, the international banks' reluctance shows they are weary of American wrath if they do business with the Afghan banks. Consequently, Afghanistan depends on immediate neighbors' currency swap and barter trade arrangements, which keep the Afghan economy at the subsistence level. However, Afghanistan's subsistence economy cannot sustain the basic needs of the Afghan populace dependent on international humanitarian assistance. There is apprehension in Pakistan that if the poverty situation in Afghanistan remains precarious, people will start migrating to the country, and the bulk of the influx will be towards Pakistan.
Third, from Pakistan's perspective, expectations from the Taliban rule of tranquillity along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and stability in the region have been dashed. Ever since the arrival of the Taliban, there has been a seventy percent increase in FaK attacks along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. Alarmingly, many Afghan nationals have been found in the FaK formations attacking Pakistan's border areas. Of late, the Taliban officials have been denying the presence of the FaK and advising Pakistan to engage with the FaK in a dialogue. Interestingly, they have offered to mediate between the FaK and the Government of Pakistan. However, one can see the contradiction in the Afghan Taliban's words and deeds that, while they deny the presence of the FaK on Afghan soil, they offer to mediate between the FaK and the Government of Pakistan. The question arises of how they can mediate if the FaK leadership and cadres are not in Afghanistan. 

The cumulative impact of the denial of educational and work rights to Afghan women has created an aversion against the Taliban rule at the international level, forbidding governments, especially in the West, from doing normal business with the Taliban government.

A few months ago, Taliban officials were quoted as saying that Supreme Leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada had issued a proclamation declaring an attack on Pakistan Haram (forbidden). When Afghan Taliban officials were requested to make the edict public, they were non-committal and parried the question. The Afghan Taliban's reluctance to rope in the FaK and its leadership has been a bone of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan. If Mullah Haibtullah's edict about Pakistan is correct and the FaK are not complying with the edict, then they are flouting the order of the "Amir-Ul Momineen" to whom the FaK owes allegiance (Baiyat). The violation of the edict raises suspicions about whether Mullah Haibtullah has actually issued such a proclamation or whether the FaK leadership has decided to flout the order. If the latter is true, the FaK leadership will be punished under the Sharia laws for disobeying the Amir Ul Momineen. In either case, it will be a big question mark on the efficacy of the Taliban's governance. The coming weeks and months should clear the fog on the issue.
How FaK and other terrorist organizations are managing their finances is yet another crucial question. Pakistan has been making demarches with the important capitals about the Indian financing of the FaK and Baloch dissident organizations through the Afghan proxies. Indian financing of these terrorist organizations continues unabated to keep Pakistan under pressure. It would be in the interest of India not to use the Afghan soil as a second front against Pakistan, for throwing stones while sitting in the glass house may ultimately hurt India.
Fourth, with the U.S. withdrawal, Afghanistan is off the radar; it's no longer in the news, even in the inner pages of international media except when there is an ISKP attack inside or outside Afghanistan. The Ukraine war and the Palestinian genocide have diverted their attention from Afghanistan. However, a continuation of ISKP and FaK activities from Afghanistan poses a formidable threat to the immediate neighbors and beyond. In a situation where the U.S. and European countries are paying the least attention to Afghanistan despite three Doha rounds under the UN auspices, immediate neighbors of Afghanistan and Russia are doing the heavy lifting under the Moscow Format (the U.S. was also part of the Moscow Format but quit it after the Ukraine war). An important feature of the Moscow Format is the emergence of QUAD—comprising Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia—in Afghanistan to coordinate their positions on Afghan issues in international forums. Since the U.S. and its allies are busy in Ukraine and Palestinian wars, Moscow-Quad is the only formidable forum to highlight the problems of Afghanistan and stay engaged with the country to keep it floating, even if at the bare minimum level. The Quad can also serve as an important platform to seek a regional solution.
Although in its nascent stage, the Quad augurs well for integrating the region from Pakistan to Central Asia and beyond. A well-coordinated effort would be required to complete connectivity projects—Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI), Central Asia-South Asia power project (CASA-1000), and the UPA railway connection—that have been pending for over two decades. Economically, these projects, while addressing the energy and transit needs of beneficiary countries, will offer Afghanistan a permanent source of income in the form of transit fees. 
Options
The foregoing issues do not present an encouraging picture of Afghanistan's peace and stability in the medium to long term. Therefore, isolating Afghanistan may not be a good option. Suppose the U.S. and the West are not interested in playing an active role in mitigating the plight of the Afghan people. In that case, the Moscow Format members may come forward to collectively address the challenges Afghanistan faces in the economic well-being of the people and counterterrorism measures. The regional approach to addressing the Afghanistan challenge should be to: 
▪ Initiate a dialogue with the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) on counterterrorism cooperation by convincing the Taliban authorities that they should come out of the denial mode and take effective measures to identify and neutralize the terrorist organizations taking shelter in Afghanistan. 
▪ Cooperate in completing connectivity projects on a priority basis to improve the Afghan economy and expedite inter- and intra-regional transit trade.
▪ Initiate dialogue within the Moscow Format about greater diplomatic interaction with the AIG aimed at recognition of the incumbent regime. However, the recognition issue may be made conditional to Taliban authorities doing away with the repressive laws banning women's education and their right to work.
▪The Moscow Format may consolidate its position at the Doha process led by the United Nations and seek enhanced humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan, especially for the 52 percent of Afghans seeking urgent relief.
The above options may not offer a comprehensive solution to the Afghan problem but can serve as a building block to addressing Afghanistan's urgent needs and securing the interests of the immediate neighbours and beyond. Since Pakistan has been deeply affected by the Afghan crisis during the past 45 years, it should lead the charge and coordinate with the Moscow Format members, including India. The time has come to adopt a regional approach to regional challenges.

The author is a former Special Representative for Afghanistan and a Senior Research Fellow at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).    
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