The Battle of Jassoran (1965) highlights a hastily planned yet strategically decisive operation where valor led to a pivotal victory despite formidable enemy defenses. This account underscores the inter-play of tactical ingenuity and perceived divine intervention in overcoming significant wartime challenges.

After intense and tireless participation in Khem Karan operations, the 3rd Armored Brigade was ordered to move to Sialkot Sector on September 10 due to enemy pressure. Meanwhile, the situation at Lahore deteriorated and 7 FF¹  was tasked to report to Headquarters 10 Division. The unit played a decisive role in the defensive battles at Bambawali-Ravi-Bedian Link Canal (BRBL) and Lahore Syphon on night of September, 10-11.² On September 12, 7 FF3 Along with 23 Cavalry, less a squadron, were placed as a counterattack/counter-penetration force for 10 Division. The unit was ordered to move to Gujranwala on September 15 since the situation at Lahore was stabilized. This meant the induction of a unit in Sialkot; the third major war theatre within a week. I was Second-in-Command of the unit, but at Lahore, I had voluntarily assumed the additional duties of Officer Commanding (CO) 'B' Company, as the company had only one officer. The Company Officer, Second Lieutenant Bilal Rana, was a brilliant and outstanding young subaltern  (later Major Bilal Rana, SJ Shaheed ex ³ Commando Battalion, who met Shahadat at Chandpur, East Pakistan in December 1971). After the battle of Lahore, I returned the company to Lieutenant Bilal Rana.
Concentration. On September 16, the battalion moved by road while the Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) were transported by train under Major Jamal Shah. Both the convoys joined at Gujranwala railway station. We moved to our concentration area in Gujranwala but were ordered to move towards our dispersal area in Pasrur. The orders were soon changed again for taking up a defensive position near Piro Chak, about 10 miles east of Chawinda. The area was unfamiliar to anybody; nevertheless, the battalion remained there for the next few days. We were out of communication with the 3^rd Armoured Brigade and did not hear even the battlefield noise where 600 tanks of two armoured divisions were fighting each other from both sides. 
Capture of Jassoran
Task Force. On September 19, 1965, at around 1200 hours, Lieutenant Bilal was ordered to report along with 'B' Company to 19 Lancers. No briefing or further information was given. Bilal came to me for guidance, and once again, I was back to lead 'B' Company. As the exact location of 19 Lancers was not provided, we moved cautiously on the route, looking for our troops. A small detachment of engineers was found, which told us to continue following the same route. I was leading in an open jeep while the APCs followed in a single file.⁵ The Commanding Officer (CO) was also asked to accompany us, but Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Rehman moved separately and reached before us. Finally, the location of 19 Lancers was found around 1500 hours, where I met Major (later Lieutenant General) Alam Jan Mahsud. 19 Lancers was also unaware of the exact task until the arrival of an officer, Major Bakhtawar Khan, in the late afternoon, who introduced himself as Second-in-Command of 14 FF.⁶ He informed us that a task force had been constituted under his command, comprising an armored infantry rifle company, each from 7 FF and 14 FF⁷, and a Squadron minus (two troops of tanks) of 19 Lancers. 
We were told that Headquarters 6 Armored Division was tasked to capture Jassoran, exploit up to Janewal, and evict the enemy position. We learned that the attack's planning included the commanding officers of 19 Lancers and 7 FF, in consultation with the task force commander, which was carried out on the map a moment ago. 
Brotherhood in Arms. Major (later Lieutenant General) Alam Jan Mahsud and other squadron commanders were all very happy to see me. I learnt about the fatal injury of Major Kiyani (a good friend of mine) early in the morning from them. 7 FF and 19 Lancers have a long history from pre-independence days. Both also served together for over a decade in Kharian and Multan under the 3rd Armored Brigade of the 1st Armored Division and later in Somalia on a United Nations mission in 1993. In the early 1990s, the professional affiliation of both units was officially granted by the Pakistan Army, which is a unique and unprecedented distinction for both. It is known as ‘Brotherhood in Arms’.  
The Confusion. It was a complex situation. The task, which comprised three different units, was conveyed and explained by the Commander Task Force himself. There was no one present from the higher formation. No reconnaissance was carried out; neither was any fire plan formally constituted, nor was the CO of any participating unit briefed personally. There was no formal linkup between the participating troops of both the AIBs and no pre-planned discussion was held. The positions and direction of the attack were explained on a map. We were told that it was a company position with some automatics; however, during the attack, it turned out that it was a company plus with a machine gun section, which included a medium machine gun (MMG) position and supported by tanks. Although a young, smart subaltern⁸ joined us as an artillery observer, I was told that the artillery cover may be unavailable due to the absence of a fire support plan. Air support was already unavailable. However, corps artillery provided cover during the operation. Later, it was learnt that before the meeting of COs, it was being considered a mopping-up operation but converted into an attack in anticipation of the presence of the enemy's armor and infantry. 
The Attack. The attack commenced around 1700 hours, when we left the forming-up place. As we neared the target, it was close to sunset, turning it into a dusk attack. A troop of tanks from the 19 Lancers, under Lieutenant Iftikhar Adam, joined the company for the attack. As soon as we reached an open area, Lieutenant Adam's tank was hit. He and his crew bailed out safely, but that marked the end of tank support, and the armor transitioned to a fire support role. The company of 14 FF was also not in our line of sight, and the enemy's artillery and automatic fire intensified. As we approached the target, the enemy fire felt like rain, accompanied by a whistling sound, but miraculously, it did not harm the assaulting wave. This incredible miracle boosted our confidence and morale. I shouted to my men to dash forward at full speed and charge the enemy positions. The unabated advance took aback the enemy despite the heavy fire of automatics. We had crossed their most effective firewall, which even a bird could not, which was enough to create panic in the defenses. The troops evicted their well-dugout trenches and fled. I ordered my men to open fire on the fleeing enemy in the same trenches. By this time, it was getting dark, and suddenly, I was witnessing an amazing scene. Enemy troops were falling on the ground in numbers under a heavy roar of an automatic. I looked towards my left and found Lance Naik Omar Din behind the enemy's deserted MMG, taking the fleeing enemy troops for a duck shoot. I shouted to him, 'Shabash (well done) Omar Din, carry on'. Luckily, Omar Din had undergone a course on MMG just before the war and knew how to operate it. The MMG still lies in the quarter guards of 7 FF as a war trophy. 
What initially looked like an enemy taking cover to the ground was found to be nearly 100 enemy casualties during the exploitation stage, where Janewal was cleared, and the area up to the railway line was secured. Rocket launchers hit two enemy tanks. After mopping up, positions were readjusted to occupy the defenses. Soon, we encountered an enemy's counterattack, which was successfully thwarted. At night, the listening post of the company apprehended Major S. P. Wadhawa, an Indian Artillery officer. He was also in possession of a map marked with Indian Artillery positions. After initial interrogation, I informed the battalion headquarters, and as per their instructions, he was sent to the Headquarters 6 Armored Division under an escort. I was later informed by the escort commander, Subedar (later Subedar Major) Sher Bahadur, that the divisional headquarters were surprised to see the map. At first light, the enemy launched a major counterattack, but the tanks and infantry were both well prepared to face it and dealt it with accurate fire. The enemy withdrew after suffering heavy casualties. The general area around Chawinda was secured and never threatened for the remaining part of the War. Later in the morning, one of the platoon commanders brought a pistol recovered from a captured enemy tank. Lieutenant Pervez Musharraf was also present at that time. Judging the young subaltern's excitement to see an enemy's weapon, I told him to keep it as a war trophy for his remembrance to be a part of the operation. In all, one tank, one MMG, two machine guns, one jeep and a heavy cache of small arms and ammunition were captured by 'B' Company alone. The enemy's overall casualties were well over 200. Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi ex-Indian vice chief, in his article 'Marathas in the 1965 Indo Pak War', writes about 6 Maratha Light Infantry, that two officers, including the CO, two JCOs (junior commissioned officers) and 36 OR (other ranks) were killed; two officers and 30 OR were wounded; and two officers; four JCO's; and 110 OR were taken prisoners of war.⁹ 
Allah Almighty Had Sent the Victory. It is widely heard regarding the 1965 War, which was about the divine support sent by Allah Almighty. That evening, we not only witnessed but also experienced it. The artillery shells were landing nearby, but the splinters were ineffective. We could physically feel the bullets blistering through our legs, under our arms, and whistling near our necks and ears. The ground felt like cotton, tank shells blowing cold waves closer to our bodies, but the divine power kept us unharmed. The impregnable defensive firewall crumbled before us like a sand wall. It was later learnt that 'B' Company 7 FF came in contact with a whole company of 6 Maratha Light Infantry. 'C' Company of 14 FF had landed against another platoon plus strength. Later reports confirmed the presence of troops of 6 Maratha Light Infantry, 20 Rajput and 5 Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Rifles, which confirmed that it was a well-dugout and heavily defended position. Major General Yashwat Deva, in his book, The Saga of Grit and Cold Courage, acknowledges the death of 37 personnel from the three battalions on the night of 19/20 September, 1965. My company suffered casualties during the entire operation: three Shaheed and four wounded.    

Witness to the Victory. Major General (later Lieutenant General and Federal Minister) Sahibzada Yakub Khan took over the command of the 1st Armored Division a day before. He witnessed the attack from a dominating viewpoint in his command tank. The next day, I was called upon by the divisional headquarters. The Colonel Staff greeted me with the remarks, 'What have you done with the Indians? You have butchered them'. He then said the general was very happy and wanted to see me in person. He rose from his chair once I entered the general's office and gracefully shook hands with me, which was an unexpected pleasant surprise.¹⁰ In a commanding yet friendly tone, he told me he had witnessed the attack. He was extremely happy and proud of the outstanding performance of the Chattaks.¹¹ He congratulated me and informed me that he had recommended me for Sitara-i-Jurat (SJ), and the General Headquarters (GHQ) had already approved it. I extended my gratitude and left his office. By the time I reported back to my unit and the company, it had already been announced on the radio, and everybody was thrilled.               Battalion’s Feat of Glory. In consultation with the battalion headquarters, citations of individuals who displayed extreme valor were forwarded to the brigade headquarters based on my recommendations. However, I had recommended three individuals for the Tamgha-i-Jurat (TJ) award and three for Imtiazi Sanad, who had displayed extreme valor. In addition to my SJ, one TJ and two Imtiazi Sanad were awarded to individuals. Lance Naik Omar Din was awarded Imtiazi Sanad, although I believe that he richly deserved TJ, considering his role in the use of MMG and inflicting the number of casualties. Naik Lal Badshah, whom I recommended for TJ, was not awarded any award, but later, he was awarded a gallantry certificate by General Officer Commanding (GOC) 1 Armored Division. Lieutenant Bilal Rana and Omar Din were also awarded the certificates.   
Denouement. It was an operation planned in haste due to paucity of time. The attack apparently appeared like the Charge of the Light Brigade, but the Allah Almighty had other plans. Jassoran was important in view of its close proximity to Chawinda Railway Station. A strongly defended position, supported by Artillery, tanks and heavy automatics, where the Indian Air Force strafed our tanks early in the morning, a rifle company of an armoured infantry battalion did the impossible. We were nicknamed as 'the victors of Jassoran' in our brigade. It remains a golden feather and an hour of glory in the history of 7 FF for the times to come. It was one of those rare moments in war history where a company pitched against a company supported by machine guns, resulting in a successful operation. I feel honored and privileged to have been an active part of it. May Allah Almighty always bestow His infinite blessings upon Pakistan and her brave armed forces, Amen.

Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Rabb Niazi, SJ (R) was commissioned in October 1949 through the 1st Course from Officers' Training School Kohat. The officer, while serving with the 7th Battalion (Coke’s) The Frontier Force Regiment, which was the first armoured infantry battalion (now called mechanized Infantry) of the Pakistan Army, actively participated in the September 1965 War on three fronts: Khem Karan, Lahore and Sialkot, travelling over 200 miles in 17 days of war. The author was awarded Sitara-i-Jurat at Jassoran (Chawinda). He has penned down his memoirs in a limited publication in 2015. This article is the reproduction of the selected portions of the war account of actions of Sialkot from his book's chapter, 'War as I Saw' (suitably edited and reworded). Second-in-Command officer who performed the additional duties as Commander 'B' Company. The officer later commanded 7 FF for an unprecedented three years, from 1968 to 1971.
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1. Military acronym for 7th Battalion, the Frontier Force Regiment.
2. 7 FF holds the battle honor for Lahore and is the only unit which is officially allowed to celebrate 'Lahore Day' on September 10 every year.
3. 7 FF had three rifle companies during the War as 'D' Company went for the raising of 14 FF prior to the war
4. Subaltern is a military term for an officer of the rank of lieutenant and second lieutenant.
5. ‘File' is a military term for moving in a single-line 
6. Military acronym for 14th Battalion the Frontier Force Regiment.
7. 7 FF and 14 FF were both armored infantry battalions (AIB), now called mechanized Infantry battalion (MIB).
8. Lieutenant Bilal Rana later informed us that he was Lieutenant (later General, Chief, and President) Pervez Musharraf, his course mate and close friend. After Bilal's shahadat in erstwhile East Pakistan in December 1971, General Musharraf named his son after him. He also mentions this in his book, 'In the Line of Fire’.
9. Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, Salute, Army History, Marathas in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, published October 29, 2015, accessed on October 14, 2022 (https://salute.co.in/marathas-in-the-1965-indo-pak-war/).
10. Sahibzada Yakub Khan was known for his strong military norms and protocol, and the gesture was uncommon appraising his repute.
11. ‘Chattak’ is the motto of 7 FF, and the members of the battalion are affectionately addressed as Chattaks.
12. Newspaper photograph published in ‘The Daily Mashriq’, Lahore, September 30, 1965