As a component of the strategy against violent extremism, Pashtuns were sensitised to the fact that Taliban were manipulating Islam for their personal political and financial interests, entirely detached from the genuine teachings of the religion. As a result, the initial Pashtun sympathy for the Taliban underwent a significant reversal, leading to the widespread restoration of peace and cultural values in the erstwhile FATA and other regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Two events proved to be disastrous for the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now part of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province: the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; and the War on Terror initiated by the U.S. against the militants in Afghanistan in 2001. They led to the emergence of extremism and militancy in FATA, which profoundly affected the local culture, customs, values, and religious orientation.
This piece explores how the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union and the U.S. War on Terror in Afghanistan disrupted the social, cultural, and religious fabric of FATA, which culminated in the emergence of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It further analyzes the role of the law enforcement agenices in eliminating terrorism and violent extremism from the tribal areas and other militancy-plagued areas of KP using kinetic and non-kinetic means, such as ideological ones. It concludes that with such a state strategy, the Pashtun sympathy for Taliban was considerably overturned, and peace and cultural traits in FATA and other militant-hit areas of KP were widely restored.
The Emergence of Extremism and Militancy in FATA
In 1979, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) provoked anger in the Afghan population. As a result, they started a holy war known as Afghan Jihad against the USSR. Consequently, the tribal people of FATA joined hands with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet occupation owing to ethnic, cultural, and religious affinities, contributing, in turn, to the rise of religious extremism in the tribal belt. The prevailing religious extremism thereof was exacerbated further with the formation of the Taliban government in Kabul following a protracted civil war that erupted among various religious and ethnic factions of Afghanistan.
Moreover, after the 9/11 incident in 2001, for which the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were held responsible, the U.S. initiated the War on Terror in Afghanistan. As a result, the Taliban government in Kabul was overthrown, and the top leadership of the Afghan Taliban, militants of Al-Qaeda, and other foreign militant outfits managed to escape Afghanistan and sought refuge across Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan, i.e., FATA. Here, the foreign militants, along with local religious parties, jihad groups, and former mujahideen-- who had fought against the Soviet troops and also had served in the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from 1994 to 2001-- exploited the tribal codes of Pashtunwali to wage jihad in Afghanistan against the U.S.-led forces and those who stopped or disapproved of their jihad, including the state of Pakistan, that had joined the U.S. in its war against terror.
Following were the prominent aspects of the Pashtun culture which the militants notoriously turned to their advantage:
▪ Panah Warkawal (Shelter Giving). As per the codes of Pashtunwali, even the most notorious criminal will be given protection if he asks for panah or shelter. Therefore, under panah warkawal (shelter giving), unconditional refuge and hospitality to militants were provided, which made the tribal areas at the time of War on Terror a hotbed of militancy.
▪ Badal (Revenge). Taking revenge is considered an obligation in the Pashtun culture, irrespective of the consequences. The militants exploited the concept of badal to recruit new fighters from among those local inhabitants who suffered casualties in the counterterror military operations and U.S. drone attacks.
▪ Melmastia (Hospitality). Melmastia means serving and protecting the melasma (guest). It obligates the Pashtuns to provide protection and serve their guests, transcending race, caste, and economic status, as long as the guest does not violate the tribal codes. As a result, when military operations were being conducted in FATA, the tribal people resisted them as they believed that the army was fighting their guests. This way, the militants benefited from the Pashtun hospitality in the Pashtun belt by availing food and shelter as logistical support to sustain their insurgency. 
▪ Tarboor (Cousin). The tribal people always used to be involved in inter-tribal rivalries. They used to have enmity with their cousins or tarboors. With the arrival of the militants in FATA, those who were weak and unable to avenge the stronger families found a chance to increase their strength by welcoming the militants and siding with them to use them against their cousins, etc., with whom they had a conflict.
Impacts of Militants on the Tribal Culture and Religion
The Afghan jihad against the Soviet invasion, the global war against terrorism after the 9/11 incident, and the consequent rise of militancy in FATA drastically affected the region's social, cultural, and religious fabric.

The militants destroyed the cultural institutions of Maliks, Hujra, and Jirga and replaced them with mosques and radical clerics of their liking to impose their version of Islam. Literature was distributed, and training centers were established where Islamic principles were misinterpreted to radicalize the Pashtuns and exploit them for their vested interests.

The militants destroyed the cultural institutions of Maliks, Hujra, and Jirga and replaced them with mosques and radical clerics of their liking to impose their version of Islam. Literature was distributed, and training centers were established where Islamic principles were misinterpreted to radicalize the Pashtuns and exploit them for their vested interests.
The militants asked the local inhabitants to join hands with them to fight their jihad, assuring them of the reward of heaven in the next world. They warned that if the locals refused to fight against the U.S. and Pakistan's security and law enforcement agencies, they would be liable for committing Kufr and go to hell. The notion of suicide, which is considered an illegal practice in Islam, was not only legalized, but highlighted as a holy act.
Traditional tribal rituals, which were earlier performed together by men and women, such as attan, were banned. Music was declared against Shariah. Women, who in the past could move freely even in the remotest regions of FATA on their own, were subjected to severe bans outside their homes and were forced to observe strict rules of purdah (veil).

The notion of suicide, which is considered an illegal practice in Islam, was not only legalized, but highlighted as a holy act.

The War Against Terrorism, Deradicalization, and Revival of the Pashtun Culture

There was already a nexus between the clerics of Lal Masjid, militant leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud from South Waziristan, and Mullah Fazlullah of the Swat Valley. However, six months after Operation Sunrise on December 14, 2007, some 40 militant leaders, commanding 40,000 militant fighters, gathered in South Waziristan to form a united front under the banner of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Initially, the activities of the Pakistani Taliban were confined to the areas of FATA; however, they expanded their network and targeted civilians and military forces nationwide. Taliban leaders' statements suggested that their agenda was to enforce their Islamist system in FATA or NWFP (presently KP) and nationwide.
Given the escalating insurgency waged by the Pakistani Taliban movement, military operations were ramped up to eliminate these militants. Some primary counterterrorism operations launched by the Pakistan Army to date include Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2002), Operation Al-Mizan (2002-2006), Operation Sherdil (2008-2009), Operation Rah-e-Rast (2009), Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009), Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014-2017), and the ongoing Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017-present). The security forces cleared all 'no-go areas' in Pakistan with these operations.
Besides using physical force to eliminate terrorism, efforts were also focused on countering the violent extremism ideologically. For instance, the radical interpretation of Islam by the Taliban regarding violence and suicide was countered by referring to relevant Quranic injunctions and the Ahadith of the Holy Prophet PBUH. 
With respect to violence, teachings of Surah Al-Baqarah, among others, were invoked, which says, “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but be not aggressive. Surely Allah loves not aggressors” (2:190). Similarly, the Prophet PBUH's disapproval of Muslims' revolt against their rulers also sought help from, which states, "A Muslim ruler is a shield for Muslims. Qital is possible under his leadership, which is why people seek his shelter. (It means that a Muslim leader must make the final decision in all matters including war and peace)." (Bukhari, 2957). This way, the Pakistani Taliban's reasoning to wage jihad against the state institutions was countered and declared un-Islamic, ideologically.
Meanwhile, concerning the prohibition of suicide, the following verses from Surah Nisa were referred to, "And do not kill yourselves. Surely, God is the most merciful" [4:29]. Along the same lines, the following saying of the Holy Prophet PBUH was quoted regarding suicide: "Whosoever kills himself with anything in this world will be tortured with it on the Day of Judgement" (Sahih Bukhari).
This way, awareness among Pashtuns was instilled that the Taliban were exploiting Islam for political and monetary benefits and had nothing to do with the teachings of Islam.
All in all, with such kinetic and ideological endeavors of the state, religious conservatism in the erstwhile FATA, in particular, and the remaining parts of KP, in general, was significantly reduced, peace was restored, and cultural traits such as Rabab, Hujra, Jirga, Mehfil, and women rights, which the militants destroyed, were revived.
Likewise, at present, the resurgent threat of TTP is being dealt with by the state in the same manner, using both kinetic and various non-kinetic means. These methods include ideological approaches, which, unlike previous resistance, are gaining significant support from the Pashtun population.

The author is an International Relations graduate who has worked as a Research Associate for the Eurasian Century Institute (ECI) in Islamabad, Pakistan.
E-mail: [email protected]

References
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Khan, Surat, Tayyab Wazir, and Arif Khan. 2019. “The Effects of Militancy and Military Operations on Pashtun Culture and Traditions in FATA.” Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ) 3 (1): 74–82. https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/3.1.7.
InpaperMagazine, From. 2017. “The Legacy of Lal Masjid.” DAWN.COM. July 13, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1345068.
Khan, Z. (n.d.). Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan. https://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1339999992_58398784.pdf