Although Beijing did not veto the amendment in the trade rules of NSG to accommodate India in 2008, yet it has maintained a firm stance on the membership of NSG. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying categorically stated that: “The recently concluded 9th NPT Review Conference has reaffirmed this consensus. On account of this, the NSG has so far regarded the status of the NPT state as a crucial standard to accept new member state.” In simple terms, China has manifested its stance that the twist in established principles of joining NSG would not be acceptable. Accordingly, it is prerequisite for India to join the NPT to become a member of the NSG club.

Since 2010, the Obama Administration has been supporting India’s bid for full membership of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) for the sake of Washington’s political, strategic and economic interests. The United States delegates argued that India was “ready for membership of the NSG” during the 2015 Annual Plenary Meeting (June 1-5, 2015) of the Group held at Bariloche in Argentina. However, the NSG members’ long-standing consensus that only Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) parties are allowed to become a member of the Group frustrates both New Delhi and Washington. China reiterated its support for consensus regarding the NPT being a cornerstone of the NSG during the recent 9th NPT Review Conference held in New York. This Chinese declaration generates an impression that Beijing would veto India’s attempt to join the NSG. Indeed, it would be having wearisome impact on the India’s ambition to join the nuclear supplier cartel, but it would be having a constructive contribution in preventing the further derailing of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, it has exposed the limits of India’s self-proclaimed ‘clean waiver’ from the Nuclear Supplier Group in 2008.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in March 1970. Though NPT impedes the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, yet it legitimizes non-nuclear weapon states right (party to the treaty) to acquire nuclear technology from the NSG for the sake of peaceful use (power generation, treating diseases such as cancer and increasing agriculture productivity) under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The NPT had failed to prevent India from nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974. India’s nuclear weapon test alarmed Pakistan. It immediately approached the United Nations’ Security Council for the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia (NWFZSA). However, Islamabad failed to establish NWFZSA to prevent India from advancing its nuclear weapons programme. Realizing the double standards of the great powers, non-implementation of the Article VI of the NPT (obliges nuclear weapon states denuclearization) and above all the discriminatory-cum-denial policies of the western nuclear supplier nations; Islamabad started its own nuclear weapons’ programme.

Importantly, India misused nuclear imports for peaceful purposes to conduct a nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974. New Delhi acquired and used illicitly spent fuel of CIRUS reactor for generating plutonium for its ‘Buddha is Smiling’ in 1974. In a reaction to the Indian act, the nuclear suppliers constituted the Nuclear Supplier Group in 1975, which entered into force in 1978. Interestingly, in mid-1970s the Americans played a key role in the negotiations for establishing NSG. They were the zealous supporters to the movement, which demands that nuclear supplier states should not do nuclear trade with those states which refused to join Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NSG members should ensure prior to the transfer of nuclear technology that the recipient state is observing comprehensive IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities.

China reiterated its support for consensus regarding the NPT being a cornerstone of the NSG during the recent 9th NPT Review Conference held in New York. This Chinese declaration generates an impression that Beijing would veto India’s attempt to join the NSG. Indeed, it would be having wearisome impact on the India’s ambition to join the nuclear supplier cartel, but it would be having a constructive contribution in preventing the further derailing of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, it has exposed the limits of India’s self-proclaimed ‘clean waiver’ from the Nuclear Supplier Group in 2008.

The Bush Administration endeavoured (July 2005-October 2008) to capture the Indian growing economic market by defying all global Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime’s norms. With the cooperation of the American nuclear-commercial-lobby, the Administration successfully pacified the nuclear cooperation pessimists in the United States, who scientifically underscored the negativity of the nuclear trade with India. The Indian leadership also acted timely and used Washington's clout in the NSG for securing exemption from the stringent nuclear export laws of the Group. Consequently, the 45-member NSG agreed in Vienna on September 6, 2008, to exempt NPT hold-out India from its guidelines that require comprehensive IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear trade. It reversed more than three decades of NSG policy that had barred the sale of nuclear fuel and reactor technology to India. Ironically, the NSG members have completely ignored the foundational logic of the NSG in 1975, which entered into force in 1978. Neither, they have pressurized India to join the NPT for the sake of nuclear technological assistance, nor they are preserving the philosophical constructs of the NSG.

Since India received waiver from the Nuclear Supplier Group and entry-into-force of Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008, the New Delhi has been endeavouring to become a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group. India’s Nuclear Supplier Group membership may be having lesser economic dividends for it in the prevalent global economic setting, however, its NSG membership would have immense political and strategic significance in the global politics. Importantly, even if India fails to secure an NSG membership, it could not be deprived from sophisticated nuclear technology. The nuclear supplier nations would continue to transfer advanced nuclear technology to India despite the fact that it is not party to the NPT and is also a declared nuclear weapon state.

It was reported that India has formally applied for the membership of MTCR, a club of 34 countries that controls trade in missile and space technology. India’s joining application may happen at MTCR’s plenary due in September-October 2015. It seems that New Delhi might get membership of the MTCR because China is not a member of the Regime. Importantly, if India succeeds in securing the membership of NSG, it would easily join the MTCR, which would be having a constructive impact on India’s offensive and defensive missiles programmes.

The NSG membership would not only elevate India’s stature in the comity of nations, but it also facilitates its entry into other important strategic cartels, i.e. the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. These three regimes have decisive contribution in controlling the spread of military technology. In simple words, primary responsibility of these cartels is to deny military technology to the developing states or preserve the strategic imbalance between the military-technologically advantageous nations and militarily disadvantageous states.

It was reported that India has formally applied for the membership of MTCR, a club of 34 countries that controls trade in missile and space technology. India’s joining application may happen at MTCR’s plenary due in September-October 2015. It seems that New Delhi might get membership of the MTCR because China is not a member of the Regime. Importantly, if India succeeds in securing the membership of NSG, it would easily join the MTCR, which would be having a constructive impact on India’s offensive and defensive missiles programmes.

India is determined to join the NSG to revolutionize its nuclear programme through both the import and export of nuclear technology. Currently, New Delhi is allowed to import the nuclear technology for its non-military nuclear facilities. However, it is not allowed to export the nuclear technology. Despite this, India has signed peaceful use of nuclear technology related agreements with Vietnam and Sri Lanka. The membership of NSG definitely has constructive impact on India’s nuclear industry. It’s because, being a member of NSG, New Delhi will not only get access to world-class nuclear technology but would be permitted to export its own nuclear technology to countries that comply with the NSG.

Although Beijing did not veto the amendment in the trade rules of NSG to accommodate India in 2008, yet it has maintained a firm stance on the membership of NSG. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying categorically stated that: “The recently concluded 9th NPT Review Conference has reaffirmed this consensus. On account of this, the NSG has so far regarded the status of the NPT state as a crucial standard to accept new member state.” In simple terms, China has manifested its stance that the twist in established principles of joining NSG would not be acceptable. Accordingly, it is prerequisite for India to join the NPT to become a member of the NSG club.

China seems determined to honour the international community’s long-standing consensus regarding the NPT being a cornerstone of the NSG. That’s why it also makes clear to its strategic partner Pakistan that “while it supports its gaining access to the NSG, signing the treaty was ‘crucial’.” Importantly, China has not linked the continuity of its nuclear technological assistance to Pakistan for the sake of peaceful use of nuclear technology with Islamabad’s signing of the NPT. Hence, it will not only complete Chasma-3, Chasma-4, Karachi-2 and Karachi-3 nuclear power plants but also assist Islamabad in designing and constructing nuclear power plants under the IAEA safeguards in the future.

To conclude, Beijing’s principle stance checkmates New Delhi’s bid to seek membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The writer is Director and Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He contributes for print and electronic media regularly. [email protected]