Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme received immense attention in the international media during the recent months. The impressive advancements in the nuclear capable delivery systems and miniaturized nuclear devices have further solidified the defencive punch of the country. Simultaneously, it alarms the adversary. Therefore, a few security analysts expressed their distress over the modernization of the programme. Ironically, they make baseless claims such as the “fastest-growing nuclear programme on earth” or “Pakistan might be on the verge of deploying a small tactical nuclear weapon”. They spelled out a few policy options to disrupt the qualitative improvement in the programme.

Realistically, neither Pakistan has faster-growing nuclear weapons programme nor is it contemplating to deploy its battlefield nuclear weapons. Recently, two senior American journalists David Ignatius and David E. Singer reported in Washington Post and The New York Times, respectively that Obama administration is exploring a nuclear deal with Pakistan. Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, two leading American nuclear analysts, also published a report titled “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan” in August 2015. These writings have intensified debate on Pakistan’s nuclear programme in the international media. India’s reaction on the US engagement with Pakistan in realm of peaceful use of nuclear technology was hysterical.

Islamabad, today, seems prepared to negotiate a civilian nuclear deal with Washington without compromising on its ‘credible minimum full spectrum nuclear deterrence posture’. Similarly, Pakistan’s desire to be a member of all international export control regimes, i.e. the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australian Group, Wassenaar Arrangement. However, it is not ready to compromise on its nuclear posture by accepting unrealistic conditions on its nuclear weapons programme. It’s because, Pakistan’s nuclear decision making is very much determined by its regional strategic environment instead of idealistic norms of nuclear non-proliferationists or nuclear pessimists conclusions. Moreover, Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons to defend itself from the Indian nuclear blackmail. That’s why; the national and international nuclear pessimists’ maligning and horrifying propaganda against Pakistan’s nuclear programme as well as United States and its like minded Western nations’ economic sanction had failed to thwart Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme evolution during the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Importantly, Islamabad has not only expressed its aspirations, but had also endeavoured to keep South Asia free from nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it had failed to keep South Asia free from nuclear weapons due to India’s Great Power designs. Therefore, despite Islamabad’s earnest desire to keep South Asia free from nuclear weapons, it has refrained from joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970s. Subsequently, it developed its indigenous nuclear infrastructure.

The review of Pakistan’s nuclear programme’s evolutionary history reveals that Islamabad’s nuclear policy has always been rationally perceived and logically executed. Despite that, a few strategic pundits question it prejudicially. Instead of examining Islamabad’s nuclear policy objectively, within the context of South Asian strategic environment, they demand for the rollback of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. They deliberately ignore the Indian military doctrine transformation entailing colossal military buildup. Similar flaws or deliberate negations of Pakistani concerns one noticed in Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon report — A Normal Nuclear Pakistan.

The report is an interesting reading. The contributors diligently endeavoured to prove that presently Pakistan is a typical nuclear weapon state. They also recommended Islamabad five nuclear weapon-related initiatives to become a normal nuclear weapon state. These recommendations warrant serious deliberation on the subject because speculatively these five proposals to Islamabad seem benign, but in reality these proposals are perilous for Pakistan’s national security in general and defence in particular. The report fails to treat Pakistan at par with India.

The objective analysis necessitates that each proposal ought to be examined systematically. Toby and Michael’s recommended five proposals are following:

1. Shift declaratory policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic”
deterrence.
2. Commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production 
of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons.
3. Lift Pakistan’s veto on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
negotiations and reduce or stop fissile material production.
4. Separate civilian and military nuclear facilities.
5. Sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for
India.

The aforementioned recommendations accentuate that the complex strategic environment of South Asia has completely been ignored by the authors of the report. In addition, they also disregarded India’s colossal military buildup and transformation in its military doctrine. Indeed, today, for the Americans India’s military buildup is an advantageous development due to the Indo-US strategic partnership and New Delhi’s potential to purchase American military hardware.

The Indian strategic community has successfully been propagating that India would check China’s rise in the Asian strategic environment. It’s a debatable assertion that whether New Delhi checks China or only maintain a phony rivalry with Beijing. But it’s an established fact that India’s military buildup is perilous for Pakistan’s defence. Therefore, Islamabad ought to chalk out a viable strategy to defend itself from the increasing conventional fire power of India.

India has emerged as one of the world’s largest buyers of weapons systems during the recent years. Therefore, the United States has established “India Rapid Reaction Cell at the Pentagon” to streamline the coordination required for India’s procurement of American arms in February 2015. Keith Webster, Director, International Cooperation Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, heads this cell. The cell is in the great advantage for India. New Delhi would not only use the cell to pursue its military objectives alone, but it would also be employed to facilitate New Delhi directly/indirectly to pursue its political, commercial and diplomatic targets in Washington. The cell would attract the mighty American Military Industrial Complex to invest for the sake of co-production of hi-tech military equipment in India. Both Pentagon and India would also garner military industrial complex support for lobbying at the Capitol Hill.

Many analysts seem ignorant about the factual situation when they opined that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is a fastest-growing programme. The comparative analysis of India and Pakistan nuclear inventories reveal that latter’s programme is not fastest-growing. For instance, the Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris findings contradict Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon estimates about India’s fissile material. They concluded that: “India is estimated to have produced approximately 540 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, enough for 135 to 180 nuclear warheads, though not all of that material is being used.” The Pakistani estimates also contradict the authenticity of international analysts estimates. It was reported that “Pakistani assessment is that India has enough fissile material, both reactor and weapon-grade plutonium, for more than 2,000 warheads.” In such a situation, certainly, it is difficult for Islamabad to alter its credible minimum full spectrum nuclear deterrence policy.

The proposal about “committing to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons” seems partially acceptable. But it is only viable, if Islamabad is capable to spend billions of dollars to purchase conventional sophisticated military hardware from the developed world’s military industrial complex. In simple words, Pakistan limits its nuclear weapons production and enters into an economically devastating conventional arms race with India. Indeed, it would be an economically disastrous option for Pakistan and thereby it ought to avoid conventional arms race with India.

Islamabad has been maintaining a firm stance on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament. Today, many nations are pressuring Islamabad to soften its stance on the FMCT. Conversely, Islamabad seems convinced that FMCT scope should include both arms and disarmament components. Thus, it seems appropriate to focus and address the causes due to which Pakistan is reluctant to lift its veto on FMCT negotiations at the Conference. Moreover, the current trends in the global nuclear politics also reveal that the reduction or stop of fissile material production is impossible.

Today, the long-term nuclear force modernization or advancement programmes are underway in all the nuclear armed states. According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2015, “all the nuclear weapon-possessing states are working to develop new nuclear weapon systems and/or upgrade their existing ones.” It was reported that between 2014 and 2023, the United States expects to spend $355 billion to modernize its nuclear arsenal. 
President Vladimir Putin announced on June 16, 2015: “Russia would add more than 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) to its nuclear arsenal this year’’. The following table also draws attention towards the disparity between India and Pakistan fissile material stockpiles. Thus, neither international nor regional trends support the demand of authors of the report to reduce or stop fissile material production.

The global nuclear environment is not conducive for the CTBT. This treaty lost significant support in October 1999, when the Senate of United States refused to ratify it. Therefore, it is an erroneous conclusion that Islamabad is waiting for India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The practical approach for the entry into force of the CTBT is that the United States Senate ratifies the Treaty.

To conclude, the discriminatory and arbitrary sanctions against Pakistan during the last decades of twentieth century, global war on terrorism, and cementing Indo-US strategic partnership have shifted the conventional and strategic forces balance of power overwhelmingly to the advantage of India. The Pakistani decision-makers have been forced to make the nuclear related hard choices for the sake of the country’s sovereign defence. Hence, Islamabad cannot underplay the prevalent trends in its regional strategic environment while chalking out its nuclear strategy.

The writer is Director and Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He contributes for print and electronic media regularly. [email protected]