It was not Pakistan Army or military action on 25 March that unleashed violence against Bengalis. Armed militants mostly belonging to the Awami League were already working on violent methods to target forces as well as innocent civilians. Indian agents in different guise were successful in sowing the seeds of distrust through use of propaganda and violence. They then falsely attributed all these atrocities to Pakistani forces. In fact, Indian agents and Awami League committed acts of terrorism in 1971.

Vice Admiral (retd) Taj Khattak

Q: When and where were you posted in East Pakistan before/during 1971 War? In which sector was your unit deployed at the start of the war?
A: I was posted in East Pakistan in September 1970 as navigating officer of PNS Jessore, a gunboat of Pakistan Navy. I took over command of the boat in August 1971 and remained so till the end of the war on 16 December 1971. I was in Khulna-Mangla-Barisal sector during the war and also during the period preceding war.

Q: What were the general circumstances in East Pakistan around 1971? 
A: The general circumstances and environment in East Pakistan around 1971 was tense and uncertain. The cyclone of 1970 had devastated the country with hundreds and thousands of causalities and Bengali politicians had fully exploited the situation. This resulted in large scale alienation of the Bengalis against West Pakistanis.

It is also true to some extent that West Pakistani businesses had monopolized the economy of East Pakistan. The youth in East Pakistan was particularly angry and restless and highly charged in the political sense; mostly due to negative propaganda than real grievances: Although people in West Pakistan call 1970 election the only fair and free election but in my opinion it was not quite so. I was posted to one area on the bank of Naaf River on the border of East Pakistan and Burma for election duty and the atmosphere was like later day elections in Karachi, where a political party dominates and steals the election.

Q: In media much blame for violence is attributed to military operation on 25 March 1971 in Dhaka. What is the truth behind those claims?

A: It was not Pakistan Army or military action on 25 March that unleashed violence against Bengalis. Armed militants mostly belonging to the Awami League were already working on violent method to target forces as well as innocent civilians. Indian agents in different guise were successful in sowing the seeds of distrust through use of propaganda and violence. They then falsely attributed all these atrocities to Pakistani forces. In fact, Indian agents and Awami League committed acts of terrorism in 1971.

On 26 March 1971, my gunboat entered Daulatpur Canal in District Khulna to help screaming Biharis (labour force of Amin Jute Mills) who were lined up on the bank of the canal in rows and Hindus in ‘Langots’, shaved heads and unmistaken long mane of hair, just ripped opened the stomachs of men and women, and pushed them into the river. The children were too dazed and just stuck in the mud. These Hindu murderers had obviously been positioned there before to create havoc according to a plan.

Q: What was impact of this brutal violence on the soldiers who were fighting the war?
A: The effect was adverse and only in few cases uncontrollable. You cannot have your own people killed brutally and have your hands tied at the same time. So obviously, there were reactions and sometimes, unfortunately, over-reactions. However, such incidents were strictly controlled and checked by the authorities. On mass scale nothing of that sort happened which was portrayed by Indian and Bengali media (also under influence of India).

Pakistan Armed Forces behaved professionally and did not commit any atrocities. However, the Indian propaganda was unfortunately very effective. We were engaged in civil war and had not focused on a counter narrative. We also had a crisis of leadership both in Dhaka and in Rawalpindi which is well known. And, this is now well documented in books by prominent Indian military officers. Infact, India had started preparing for this war to break Pakistan much before 1971.

Q: How do you explain geography and other local conditions peculiar to East Pakistan and their impact on 1971 War?
A: East Pakistan was difficult to defend but we had also not paid much attention to its defence. During 1965 war there was no action on East Pakistan front nor any appropriate measures taken to defend that part of Pakistan – which was taken advantage of by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and India.

Q: Please briefly narrate account of the war in your sector?
A: The war started on the evening of December 3, 1971. I must say the speech delivered by President General Yahya Khan was in more or less the same style as the earlier one. My gunboat along with another, commanded by my term-mate Lt. A. Q. Siddiqui, were providing cover to the eight or so ships anchored in Khulna so that the harbour was not blocked through sinking one or more of these merchant vessels.

The next morning, we were attacked by six Gnat aircrafts. My gunboat survived with three causalities but unluckily the other one didn’t and Lt. Siddiqui was severely injured and later succumbed to his injuries. This was particularly painful as in the mayhem in March 1971, he had lost his sister and brother-in-law to the Mukhti Bahinis as they were working in Karnaphully Paper Mills owned by the Bhawanis some 60 miles from Chittagong.

The next shock came on the same evening when our local commander, Commander Gul Zarin along with Mr. Islam, Chairman of the port deserted in a merchant ship reportedly with a huge haul of gold and foreign currency. This lowered the morale of the sailors but they were motivated to keep fighting as everyone is responsible for his own conduct.

On the third day of the war, Jessore cantonment had fallen and Barisal was to be the next line of defence. We collected troops of East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces (EPCAF) which numbered some 500 and headed for Barisal. Enroute we were attacked from air and we unfortunately lost some boats and the soldiers they were carrying. When we reached Barisal two days later, it was learnt that this garrison had also fallen and had been evacuated earlier in the day.

So, we proceeded to Chittagong. This was a difficult patch of river route to travel through, as there were constant air attacks, the navigational buoys in the river had been removed by the Muktis and as we later learnt that the outer approach of Chittagong harbour was also mined. We reached there on 13th December but by that time Indian Army was on the outskirts of Chittagong. At this time, I assumed command of a land company deployed near Cadet College Chittagong as there was little or no war to be fought at sea.

Here I would like to add that the war performance by ordinary officers and sailors was superb under these very difficult conditions. They were always eager to face the enemy and I didn’t see anyone with a desire to shy away from his national duty, the shameful conduct of Commander Gul Zarin, notwithstanding. 
The state of logistics was obviously very poor because of the long distance and aerial and sea blockade during the war.

Q: Today India is again actively involved in anti-Pakistan activities including acts of terrorism particularly in Balochistan, FATA, Karachi and other parts of the country. What measures would you suggest to respond effectively keeping in view India’s negative role in 1971 and its consequences?

A: The year 2015 is not 1971, nor is Pakistan what was East Pakistan during that era. We must expose Indian involvement in Pakistan in the media to Indian sponsors and its allies without any hesitation and take direct actions. This apologetic conduct with respect to India should come to an end.

If the Indians do not stop this interference, we must warn them like General Zia warned Rajiv Gandhi at the height of Operation Brasstacks. They and their sponsors/allies must be told of serious dangers of the ‘war of agencies’ in the sub-continent in which there will be no winners.

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majgenaskari.jpgDuring 1971 War, Indian propaganda was most meticulously conducted both at domestic and international level. This massive propaganda created perfect optical illusion for Bengalis and rest of the world. It manipulated facts, distorted the history and turned brothers into enemies.

Maj Gen (Retd) Askari Raza Malik

Q: What were the general circumstances in East Pakistan around 1971? How would you explain the sentiments and behaviour of a common Begali towards Pakistan?
A. I was posted to East Pakistan on November 25, 1971 in the ISI detachment at Jessore. By then India had already commenced hostilities and insurgency was at low key in major cities. In the suburbs, Mukti Bahini actively supported by Indian agents was very active, laying ambushes and firing on isolated groups and vehicles. The population remained passive but the general sentiment was one of hate, Shala Punjabi (they considered every West Pakistani as Punjabi) betrayed the hatred that had been whipped up among the masses.

Q: Were we responsible for unleashing the violence genie due to March 25 military action? 
A. It is true that the military action was swift and stern as all such operations are but it is also true that the Bengali Regiments were well prepared and had already committed Awami League members on a killing spree of the unarmed West Pakistani civilians, Biharis and unarmed military personnel serving in far off places in small pockets. Their actions were barbaric and spared no one including women and children. The Bengali cooks poisoned the food of their masters and the household help came with daggers to slaughter others. This was a mayhem, which was taking place alongside the military action as they were well prepared for the events that were taking shape. The Indian agents planned these atrocities. India and its Bengali agents in political disguise committed these atrocities with only one agenda and that was dismemberment of Pakistan.

Q: What did you witness during that period and what was its impact on the soldiers who were fighting the war?
A. As I said, before I reached Jessore, the atrocities committed by the Indians/Bengalis had been brought under control except in isolated pockets of low or no resistance. The methods used were no different than the Taliban. The Muktis murdered an Army officer who had not defected. They killed the defenseless Biharis daily who had by now learnt to barricade themselves in their exclusive neighbourhoods. I had to lead an operation to free Raj Bari, a Bihari town from the Muktis and Indian Army personnel.

Q: Pakistani soldiers are blamed for atrocities against civilian Bengali population. What was the situation on ground?
A. All due to propaganda! Individual cases of excesses committed by Pakistani soldiers cannot be ruled out. I know at least a couple of such officers who were dismissed from service on repatriation but there was no organized or intended misbehaviour with the civilian population. The Indians propagated that the Army had made so many million women pregnant. It was preposterous. Neither the numbers nor the time supported this Indian contention.

Q: In your view, how effective was Indian propaganda in perception making both inside and outside East Pakistan?
A. During 1971 War, Indian propaganda was most meticulously conducted both at domestic and international level. This massive propaganda created perfect optical illusion for Bengalis and rest of the world. It manipulated facts, distorted the history and turned brothers into enemies. What is known as “exterior manoeuvre” by the military, Indira Gandhi had herself toured a number of countries as a part of the manoeuvre to isolate Pakistan. In fact, according to military analysis the war had already been lost before the battle was joined by our soldiers.

Q: How much is the role of India in training and provision of weapons/equipment to Mukti Bahini?
A. Mukti Bahini was trained for a long time by Indian Army and was also equipped with the weapons – the same equipment used by the Indian Army itself. The deserting thousands of Bengali soldiers and officers who provided them the command structure further boosted Mukti Bahini’s strength. It was a strong force of 100,000, which proved to be the pivot for Indian Army operations. It is also true that Mukti Bahini and Indian agents in large numbers were working hand in glove against Pakistan Army.

Q: What was the state of logistics and other necessary reinforcements to the soldiers in the war from the West Pakistan?
A. Logistic support was only possible by sea and air. Sea blockade had come much earlier. Only PIA was flying via Colombo. Because of Indian Air Force ruling the skies (PAF had one squadron), therefore no logistic movement was possible. We were compelled to use the ammunition we had with no resupplies possible and lived off the land for food, purchasing essentials from the villages around. These were adverse logistic conditions and that badly affected the outcome of the war.

Q: Any particular incident you remember of these days?
A. Jessore fell on the 6th of December. All the intelligence and non-fighting units were grouped together under the command of my Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Haq from Punjab Regiment with me as his Second-in-Command. We were ordered to withdraw to Faridpur along with the divisional headquarters and further sent to defend Golundo Ghat, the ferry site opposite Dhaka with about ten miles of river separating us. From there we were ordered to carry out operations wherever needed to help rescue the Biharis or other stranded parties.

On the night of surrender, I fell sick. My ulcer ruptured and I needed medicines. In the morning, I asked a Bengali fighter to fetch me medicines. I had given him more money than needed. When he came back, an Indian major spotted him. He addressed him like “hey you ba*****, what on earth you are doing with him” or words to that effect. The Mukti was shocked at the insult. At that moment I told him “brother you had asked for it.”

Our officers and men fought courgeously in these extremely unfavourable conditions. Here I narrate you one incident. Captain Anis was found sprawled on the opposite slope of an enemy machine gun bunker, which he had destroyed while he was being sprayed with an automatic machine gun. Upon witnessing that, the Indian GOC brought his young officers to the site to show them how an infantry officer should die.

Major Bahadur Ali Shah had withdrawn his company through a minefield, refusing to surrender leaving no wounded or dead behind. The Indian GOC caught up with our convoy while we were prisoners and asked for Major Bahadur. He carried for him his bedding and praised him before his officers for his courage and sense of honour and was astonished that the Major had knowingly decided to cross a minefield and had the calm to collect and carry his dead and wounded with him through the minefield.

Similarly, the Indian GOC had found a gunner lying dead on his gun. His body was shown as an example of a gunner dying during war. The officers and men fought with traditional enthusiasm but the odds were against us. The Indians had such intimate knowledge of our defences that according to an Indian officer, “we knew even the number of bricks laid in each of your bunker”.

Q: How would you view the war performance of a common Pakistani officer and soldier under those conditions?
A. The war was lost on the strategic plain. A political problem was not solved politically and passed on to the military without adequately preparing and equipping it for the said task. Our officers and men fought to the best of their abilities. They fought bravely but outcome was beyond their control.

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Despite all odds including the hostile population, less in numbers and equipment, thousand miles away from the home country and unfavourable geography/climatic conditions, Pakistani soldiers fought tenaciously and heroically. They defeated the enemy in many encounters but lost the war due to unfavourable strategic realities.
Lt Col (Retd) Saifullah Khan

Q: What were the general circumstances in East Pakistan around 1971? 
A. The organized colonies of Dhaka less the old city were quite normal. In old city the drivers of cycle rikshaw were seen busy in their daily chores. Bread earners, labourers and workers looked normal like in others cities of Pakistan. I did not see the hateful looks of Bengalis anywhere in my sphere of movement.
As for as a common Bengali was concerned, the laurels of independence, freedom and democracy did not reach him fully. Even at the time of 1971 War in the countryside, they would invariably raise slogan of “Ayub Khan Zindabad ” at the sight of troops.

The Hindu community was controlling the educational activities, training of Mukti Bahini and smuggling through Sundarbun, especially of the raw material for the industry in West Bengal. As compared to 1947, economic conditions of common Bengali improved considerably. But Awami League for political reasons and India to dismember Pakistan, had been able to create a deep sense of deprivation and dissatisfaction. A disquiet had spread all over.

Q: Usually much blame for violence is attributed to military operation on 25 March 1971 in Dhaka. Who, in your view, were the perpetrators of violence in 1971?
A. There is not an iota of doubt about the brutalities committed by Bengali traitors along with Indian agents without any provocations from West Pakistanis. There had been no abnormal and pronounced hatred visible in the West Pakistani soldiers or civilians. The disdain of Bengalis and Biharis against each other was visible to West Pakistanis from time to time. Here I would like to mention that in media much ill is attributed to military action of 25 March. It is said that Bengalis reacted to this operation and resorted to violent activities. This is totally false; actually, Awami League and Indian agents had already started giving military training to Bengalis particularly students. These armed militants started killing common West Pakistanis, pro-Pakistan Bengalis, Biharis and even uniformed soldiers much before March 1971.

Q: In your view, how effective was Indian propaganda in perception making?
A. Indian policy makers, strategists and statesmen consider propaganda as an effective tool and use it against the enemy along with other conventional weapons. Similarly, they are scared of propaganda if it is used against them. Indian propaganda outside East Pakistan was like “victory without war” and if we look inside East Pakistan it was also “victory without war” after deducting weightage of one depleted squadron of Sabres, one old vintage submarine, one squadron of proto-type tanks and thirty thousand soldiers dissipated in whole East Pakistan. Yet the Indian propaganda did not affect our soldiers who were determined to fight with the enemy till December 16, 1971. On that day, situation and decision both went out of their domain and they had to accept the destiny.

Q: What was the state of logistics and other necessary reinforcements to the soldiers in the war from the West Pakistan due to long distance involved and the Indian factor?
A. As far as logistic support for East Pakistan was concerned it was not given a serious thought at any level. Unfortunately a poetic slogan of “Defence of East Pakistan lies in defence of West Pakistan” had been ruling the hierarchy and strategists for five decades. Similarly the logistic strategy was also overshadowed by the fore-quoted slogan. Due to distances involved, requirement of strong Navy with aircraft carriers and strong air power were the pre-requisites which were probably beyond the purchasing power of the country. Despite all odds including hostile population, being less in numbers and equipment, thousand miles away from the home country and unfavourable geography/climatic conditions, Pakistani soldiers fought tenaciously and heroically. They defeated the enemy in many encounters but lost the war due to unfavourable strategic realities.

If we look at the first day’s war, a squadron of Sabre Fighter Aircrafts (old vintage) at Dhaka airfield did wonders in the history of air warfare. The waves of Indian fighter aircrafts (Migs 21 and SU-7 with fantastic maneuverability and speed) were combating one another. The sky and horizon was overcast with aircrafts like in a classic dogfight we see in movies. Hats off to the pilots of Sabres who shot down enemy’s 18-20 aircrafts on D-Day with loss of only two Sabres. Our Sabres when flying alone looked to me as great flying machines but on D-Day of war while fighting with Indian Mig 21 and SU-7, they looked similar to ‘rickshaws’ competing with Toyota cars. Our Sabres with rockets/cannons taught pilots of Migs and SU-7 a lesson and the next day they were not coming in waves. The valiant anti-aircraft gunners did not lag behind by pulling down 6-8 enemy’s aircrafts. They were furious and aggressive when two of their guns were rendered upside down in the gun emplacements by the Indian rocketing.

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majazmat.jpgPakistan Army’s efforts were to put an end to Awami League’s unlawful regime of terror and intimidation. Our soldiers were being controlled and commanded by the officers and nobody was ever allowed to take law into their own hands.   

Maj (Retd) Azmat Raja  

Q: When and where were you posted in East Pakistan during 1971 War? 
A. My unit, 29 Baloch Regiment, formed part of 57 Brigade. Our troops were deployed in Pragpur, Bharamera, Narvingong and Kushtia. Most of the troops were deployed on the border and on banks of small riverines. Platoons and sections were deployed thinly and in a linear fashion with a view to covering the entire area.

Q: What were the general circumstances in East Pakistan around 1971?
A. Since March 1971, a full scale guerilla war was going on in East Pakistan. Daily there were many casualties among the fighting troops. No place was safe, and at any time a bullet could come from any direction. Mukti Bahinis were mixed among civilian population and it was difficult to identify them.
Mukhti Bahini and Bengali guerillas killed thousands of Biharis before the breakout of actual war. We saw many rooms and houses where innocent people were packed and burnt alive. Many young children who had escaped death at the hands of Mukti Bahini told us how their parents were brutally killed by Mukti Bahini right in front of them while the Indian propagandists churned out lies and blamed Pakistan Army to garner support from the international community.

Q: Why are we blamed for massacre on 25 March 1971? What is the reality?
A. We are blamed only because of Indian propaganda and lies. All the western media was taken to selected refugee camps and was briefed. During these interactions, facts were distorted and false stories were shared. Similarly, they ran a total negative campaign against Pakistani forces. Our military operations were carried out to retrieve and clear certain areas where Mukti Bahini and militants were hiding, or to arrest some most-wanted people. However, Indian intelligence had well in time penetrated East Pakistan and they along with their Mukti Bahini agents and accomplices kept planning sabotage activities to damage Pakistan Army installations throughout the war. At the same time, Mukti Bahini rebels and Indian propagandists acted as India’s fifth columnist. On the other hand, press in West Pakistani was ordered by the Information Ministry to not cover the violence unleashed by the Bengali rebels in East Pakistan during March-April 1971 as it could have repercussions in West Pakistan and also put the negotiations with Awami League at stake.

It is the hard fact that Biharis were brutally killed on a massive scale by Mukti Bahini and Bengali guerillas along with deserters of East Pakistan Rifles and the East Bengal Regiment. After March 1971, I saw many Pakistan troops, convoys and civilians being ambushed resulting in 30 to 50 casualties everyday and a helicopter used to airlift injured bodies to CMH Rawalpindi. Thousands of men of our army were martyred in a couple of months along with the non-Bengalis.

One of the first target of the operations, Dhaka University, was also one of the main platforms of Mukti Bahini where they trained people, held demonstrations and used the university laboratories to make explosives.

Q: How did we respond to this brutality?
A. Many operations were carried out in the villages to conduct sweep and search operations with a view to clearing the areas where Mukti Bahini guerillas were hiding. The Army was given orders not to shoot anyone unless they were attacked. Pakistan Army’s efforts were to put an end to Awami League’s unlawful regime of terror and intimidation. Our soldiers were being controlled and commanded by the officers and nobody was ever allowed to take law into their own hands. Even for minor offences soldiers were court-martialled to make it an example for others.

Q: Any unforgettable event during the war?
A. One day after midnight, it was reported that an anti-tank mine was laid on road near my company area. I told the Havildar Major to go and bring that mine. After half an hour, he returned with the mine in his left hand and saluted me with the other!

Awami League leaders at different levels, and the leaders of its affiliated organizations, will help in the recruitment process. The youths and the students would be recruited from the refugee and youth camps. Indian Government will arrange for their training by the specialized units of the Indian Army. Indian authorities will take full responsibilities for their maintenance, sustenance and deployment. The force will be armed and equipped by the Indian Army. No one else other than the Prime Minister and we three shall know anything about this special force. We three are supposed to act as liaison officers between the Prime Minister and the concerned authorities of the Indian side. The main task of this force will be, in the post-independence period, to safeguard Awami League's interests by remaining directly under the Prime Minister. Although, it has been decided to name it BLF, at a later stage if necessary, it could be changed to Mujib Bahini. To dispel any misgivings necessary propaganda will be made that this force if required will go to the Western front to fight along the friendly forces to free Sheikh Mujib from his captivity. To facilitate the recruitment four student leaders have already been selected. They are Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni, Shirajul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzak and Tofayel Ahmed. It is also learnt that Abdul Quddus Makhan, Shajahan Shiraj and Nure Alam Siddiqui may join this group of youth and student leaders. (Later on, four of them were branded as 'Char Khalifas' among the people of Bangladesh.) Overall responsibility of this force will remain in the hands of Gen. Oban Singh, the head of RAW (Research and Analysis Wing). The force will be trained in a special training camp at Chakraul near Dehradoon. Various specialized trainers will train them.
(Ambassador Lt. Col. (Retd) Shariful Haq Dalim Bir Uttam, Bangladesh Untold Facts, P223)